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Abstract
Prior measurement studies of the Internet have explored traf-
ﬁc and topology, but have largely ignored edge hosts. While
the number of Internet hosts is very large, and many are
hidden behind ﬁrewalls or in private address space, there is
much to be learned from examining the population of visi-
ble hosts, those with public unicast addresses that respond to
messages. In this paper we introduce two new approaches
to explore the visible Internet. Applying statistical popula-
tion sampling, we use censuses to walk the entire Internet
address space, and surveys to probe frequently a fraction of
that space. We then use these tools to evaluate address us-
age, where we ﬁnd that only 3.6% of allocated addresses are
actually occupied by visible hosts, and that occupancy is un-
evenly distributed, with a quarter of responsive /24 address
blocks (subnets) less than 5% full, and only 9% of blocks
more than half full. We show about 34 million addresses are
very stable and visible to our probes (about 16% of respon-
sive addresses), and we project from this up to 60 million
stable Internet-accessible computers. The remainder of allo-
cated addresses are used intermittently, with a median occu-
pancy of 81 minutes. Finally, we show that many ﬁrewalls
are visible, measuring signiﬁcant diversity in the distribution
of ﬁrewalled block size. To our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to
take a census of edge hosts in the visible Internet since 1982,
to evaluate the accuracy of active probing for address census
and survey, and to quantify these aspects of the Internet.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Net-
work Architecture and Design—Network topology; C.2.3
[Computer-Communication Networks]: Network Opera-
tions—Network management
General Terms: Management, Measurement, Security
Keywords: Internet address allocation, IPv4, ﬁrewalls,
survey, census
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1 Introduction
Measurement studies of the Internet have focused primar-
ily on network trafﬁc and the network topology. Many sur-
veys have characterized network trafﬁc in general and in spe-
ciﬁc cases [28, 36, 8, 43, 14]. More recently, researchers
have investigated network topology, considering how net-
works and ISPs connect, both at the AS [10, 46, 12, 32, 7]
and router levels [47, 29]. These studies have yielded insight
into network trafﬁc, business relationships, routing opportu-
nities and risks, and network topology.
For the most part these studies have ignored the popula-
tion of hosts at the edge of the network. Yet there is much
to be learned from understanding end-host characteristics.
Today, many simple questions about hosts are unanswered:
How big is the Internet, in numbers of hosts? How densely
do hosts populate the IPv4 address space? How many hosts
are, or could be, clients or servers? How many hosts are
ﬁrewalled or behind address translators? What trends guide
address utilization?
While simple to pose, these questions have profound im-
plications for network and protocol design. ICANN is ap-
proaching full allocation of the IPv4 address space in the
next few years [21]. How completely is the currently allo-
cated space used? Dynamically assigned addresses are in
wide use today [50], with implications for spam, churn in
peer-to-peer systems, and reputation systems. How long is a
dynamic address used by one host? Beyond addresses, can
surveys accurately evaluate applications in the Internet [16]?
We begin to answer these questions in this paper. Our ﬁrst
contribution is to establish two new methodologies to study
the Internet address space. To our knowledge, we are the
ﬁrst to take a complete Internet census by probing the edge
of the network since 1982 [41]. While multiple groups have
taken surveys of fractions of the Internet, none have probed
the complete address space.
Our second contribution to methodology is to evaluate the
0Thistechnicalreportisanextendedversionofapapertoappear
the the ACM Internet Measurement Conference, in Vouliagmeni,
Greece, in October 2008. The appendices represent additional ma-
terialnotintheconferencepaper. Thistechnicalreportwasreleased
February 2008 and updated and reformatted in August and Septem-
ber 2nd, 2008 to include changes to the conference version and to
move the contents of Appendix B from the paper body.visible to ICMP
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Figure 1: Classifying Internet addressable computers.
effectiveness of surveys that frequently probe a small frac-
tion of the edge of the network. We are not the ﬁrst to ac-
tively probe the Internet. Viruses engage in massively par-
allel probing, several groups have examined Internet topol-
ogy [13, 45, 19, 40], and a few groups have surveyed random
hosts [16, 49]. However, to our knowledge, no one has ex-
plored the design trade-offs in active probing of edge hosts.
We describe our methodology in Section 2, and in Section 4
explore the trade-offs between these approaches.
Ultimately our goal is to understand the host-level struc-
ture of the Internet. A full exploration of this goal is larger
than the scope of any one paper, because the relationship be-
tween IP addresses and computers is complex, and all survey
mechanisms have sources of bias and limitation. We address
how computers and IP addresses relate in Section 3. Active
probing has inherent limitations: many hosts today are un-
reachable, hidden behind network-address translators, load
balancers, and ﬁrewalls. Some generate trafﬁc but do not
respond to external requests. In fact, some Internet users
take public address space but use it only internally, without
even making it globally routable. Figure 1 captures this com-
plexity, highlighting in the cross-hatched area the visible In-
ternet, hosts with public unicast addresses that will respond
to contact. While this single paper cannot fully explore the
host-level Internet, our methodologies take a signiﬁcant step
towards it in Section 3 by measuring the visible Internet and
estimating speciﬁc sources of measurement error shown in
this ﬁgure. More importantly, by deﬁning this goal and tak-
ing a ﬁrst step towards it we lay the groundwork for potential
future research.
An additional contribution is to use our new methodolo-
gies to estimate characteristics of the Internet that have un-
til now only been commented on anecdotally. In Section 5
we evaluate typical address occupancy, shedding light on dy-
namic address usage, showing that the median active address
is continuously occupied for 81 minutes or less. We estimate
the size of the stable Internet (addresses that respond more
than 95% of the time), and show how this provides a loose
upper bound on the number of servers on the Internet, over-
counting servers by about a factor of two. Finally, with our
three years of censuses, we show trends in address alloca-
tion and utilization and estimate current utilization. We ﬁnd
that only 3.6% of allocated addresses are actually occupied
by visible hosts, and that occupancy is unevenly distributed,
with a quarter of responsive /24 address blocks1 less than 5%
full, and only 9% of blocks more than half full.
While we take great pains to place error bounds on our
estimates, these estimates are approximations. However, no
other measurements of edge hosts exist today with any er-
ror bounds. Given the growing importance of understanding
address usage as the ﬁnal IPv4 address blocks are delegated
by ICANN, we believe our rough estimates represent an im-
portant and necessary step forward. We expect that future
research will build on these results to tighten estimates and
extend our methodology.
Our ﬁnal contribution is to study trends in the deployment
of ﬁrewalls on the public Internet (Section 6). Firewalls re-
spond to probes in several different ways, perhaps respond-
ing negatively, or not responding at all, or in some cases
varying their response over time [42, 3]. Estimating the exact
number of ﬁrewalls is therefore quite difﬁcult. However, we
present trends in ﬁrewalls that respond negatively over seven
censuses spread over 15 months. Many such ﬁrewalls are
visible and we observe signiﬁcant diversity in the distribu-
tion of ﬁrewalled block size. While the absolute number of
ﬁrewalled blocks appears stable, the ratio of coverage of vis-
ible ﬁrewalls to the number of visible addresses is declining,
perhaps suggesting increasing use of invisible ﬁrewalls.
2 Census and Survey Methodology
Statisticalpopulation sampling has developed twotools to
study human or artiﬁcial populations: censuses, that enumer-
ate all members of a population; and surveys that consider
only a sample. Our goal is to adapt these approaches to study
the Internet address space. These tools complement each
other, since a census can capture unexpected variation or rare
characteristics of a population, while surveys are much less
expensive and so can answer more focused questions and be
taken more frequently. We expect censuses to capture the di-
versity of the Internet [37] as shown in our ﬁrewall estimates
(Section 6), while surveys allow us to evaluate dynamic ad-
dress usage (Section 5.1).
An Internet census poses several challenges. At ﬁrst
glance, the large number of addresses seems daunting, but
there are only 232, and only about half of these are allocated,
public, unicast addresses, so a relatively modest probe rate
of 1000 probes/s (about 256kb/s) can enumerate the entire
space in 49 days. Also challenging is how to interpret the
results; we use censuses to study trends (Section 5.3) and
ﬁrewalls (Section 6). We also must probe in a manner that is
unlikely to be confused with malicious scans, and to under-
stand the effects of lost probes on the results.
Complementing censuses, surveys avoid the problem of
population size by probing a subset of addresses. Instead it
poses the question of who is sampled and how often. Their
primarychallengeistoensurethatthesampleislargeenough
to provide conﬁdence in its representation of Internet, that
it is unbiased, and to understand what measurement uncer-
tainty sampling introduces. We review these approaches
1We use the term address block in preference to subnetwork be-
cause a subnet is the unit of router conﬁguration, and we cannot
know how the actual edge routers are conﬁgured.next, and then explore their limits and results.
2.1 Probing Design
Like tools such as Nmap [38], our approaches are forms
of active probing. Census and survey share common choices
in how probes are made and interpreted.
Requests: For each address, we send a single probe mes-
sage and then record the time until a reply is received as well
as any (positive or negative) reply code. We record lack of
a reply after a liberal timeout (currently 5s, while 98% of
responses are returned in less than 0.6s) as a non-reply.
Several protocols could be used for probing, including
TCP, UDP, and ICMP. Two requirements inﬂuence our
choice. The ﬁrst is response ubiquity—ideally all hosts will
understand our probes and react predictably. Second, we de-
sire probes that are innocuous and not easily confused with
malicious scans or denial-of-service attacks.
We probe with ICMP echo-request messages because
many hosts respond to pings and it is generally considered
benign. We considered TCP because of the perception that
it is less frequently ﬁrewalled and therefore more accurate
than ICMP, but discarded it after one early census (TCP1,
Table 1) because that survey elicited thirty times more abuse
complaints than ICMP surveys. We study this trade-off in
Section 3.2, showing that while there is signiﬁcant ﬁltering,
ICMP is a more accurate form of active probing than TCP.
Replies: Each ICMP echo request can result in several po-
tential replies [23], which we interpret as following:
Positive acknowledgment: We receive an echo reply (type
0), indicating the presence of a host at that address.
Negative acknowledgment: We receive a destination un-
reachable (type 3), indicating that the host is either down or
the address is unused. In Section 6 we subdivide negative
replies based on response code, interpreting codes for net-
work, host, and communication administratively prohibited
(codes 9, 10, and 13) as positive indication of a ﬁrewall.
We receive some other negative replies; we do not con-
sider them in our analysis. Most prominent are time-
exceeded (type 11), accounting for 30% of responses and 3%
of probes; other types account for about 2% of responses.
No reply: Non-response can have several possible causes.
First, either our probe or its response could have accidentally
failed to reach the destination due to congestion or network
partition. Second, it may have failed to reach the destination
due to intentionally discard by a ﬁrewall. Third, the address
may not be occupied (or the host temporarily down) and its
last-hop router may decline to generate an ICMP reply.
Request frequency: Each run of a census or survey covers
a set of addresses. Censuses have one pass over the entire
Internet, while surveys make a multiple passes over a smaller
sample (described below). Each pass probes each address
once in a pseudo-random order.
We probe in a pseudo-random sequence so that the probes
to any portion of the address space are dispersed in time.
This approach also reduces the correlation of network out-
ages to portions of the address space, so that the effects of
any outage near the prober are distributed uniformly across
the address space. Dispersing probes also reduces the likeli-
hood that probing is considered malicious.
One design issue we may reconsider is retransmission of
probes for addresses that fail to respond. A second probe
would reduce the effects of probe loss, but it increases the
cost of the census. Instead, we opted for more frequent cen-
suses rather than a more reliable single census. We consider
the effects of loss in Section 3.5.
Implementation requirements: Necessary characteris-
tics of our implementation are that it enumerate the Inter-
net address space completely, dispersing probes to any block
across time, in a random order, and that it support selecting
or blocking subsets of the space. Desirable characteristics
are that the implementation be parallelizable and permit easy
checkpoint and restart. Our implementation has these char-
acteristics; details appear in Appendix A.
2.2 Census Design and Implementation
Our census is an enumeration of the allocated Internet ad-
dress space at the time the census is conducted. We do not
probe private address space [39], nor multicast addresses.
We also do not probe addresses with last octet 0 or 255,
since those are often unused or allocated for local broad-
cast in /24 networks. We determine the currently allocated
address space from IANA [22]. IANA’s list is actually a su-
perset of the routable addresses, since addresses may be as-
signed to registrars but not yet injected into global routing
tables [31]. We probe all allocated addresses, not just those
currently routed, because it is a strict superset and because
routing may change over census duration as they come on-
line or due to transient outages.
An ideal census captures an exact snapshot of the Internet
at given moment in time, but a practical census takes some
time to carry out, and the Internet changes over this time.
Probing may also be affected by local routing limitations,
but we show that differences in concurrent censuses are rel-
atively small and not biased due to location in Section 3.3.
We have run censuses from two sites in the western and
eastern United States. Probes run as fast as possible, limited
by a ﬁxed number of outstanding probes, generating about
166kb/s of trafﬁc. Our western site is well provisioned, but
we consume about 30% of our Internet connection’s capacity
atoureasternsite. Table1showsourcensusescensusessince
June 2003 and surveys since March 2006. (Two anomalies
appear over this period: The NACK rates in two censuses
marked with asterisks, IT11w and IT12w, were corrected to re-
move around 700M NACKs generated from probes to non-
routable addresses that pass through a single, oddly conﬁg-
ured router. Also, the decrease in allocated addresses be-
tween 2003 and 2004 is due to IANA reclamation, not the
coincidental change in methodology.)
2.3 Survey Design and Implementation
Survey design issues include selecting probe frequency of
each address and selecting the sample of addresses to survey.
How many: Our choice of how many addresses to survey is
governed by several factors: we need a sample large enough
to be reasonably representative of the Internet population,
yet small enough that we can probe each address frequently
enough to capture individual host arrival and departure withreasonable precision. We studied probing intervals as small
as 5 minutes (details omitted due to space); based on those
results we select an interval of 11 minutes as providing rea-
sonable precision, and being relatively prime to common hu-
man activities that happen on multiples of 10, 30, and 60
minutes. We select a survey size of about 1% of the allo-
cated address space, or 24,000 /24 blocks to provide good
coverage of all kinds of blocks and reasonable measurement
error; we justify this fraction in Section 4.2. A survey em-
ploys a single machine to probe this number of addresses. To
pace replies, we only issue probes at a rate that matches the
timeout rate, resulting in about 9,200 probes/second. At this
rate, each /24 block receives a probe once every 2–3 seconds.
Which addresses: Given our target sample size, the next
question is which addresses are probed. To allow analysis at
both the address- and block-granularity we chose a clustered
sample design [17] where we fully enumerate each address
in 24,000 selected /24 blocks.
An important sampling design choice is the granularity
of the sample. We probe /24 blocks rather than individ-
ual addresses because we believe blocks are interesting to
studyasgroups. (Unlikepopulationsurveys, whereclustered
sampling is often used to reduce collection costs.) Since
CIDR [11] and BGP routing exploit common preﬁxes to re-
duce routing table sizes, numerically adjacent addresses are
often assigned to the same administrative entity. For the
same reason, they also often share similar patterns of packet
loss. To the extent that blocks are managed similarly, prob-
ing an entire block makes it likely that we probe both net-
work infrastructure such as routers or ﬁrewalls, and edge
computers. We survey blocks of 256 addresses (/24 pre-
ﬁxes) since that corresponds to the minimal size network that
is allowed in global routing tables and is a common unit of
address delegation.
We had several conﬂicting goals in determining which
blocks to survey. An unbiased sample is easiest to analyze,
but blocks that have some hosts present are more interesting,
and we want to ensure we sample parts of the Internet with
extreme values of occupancy. We also want some blocks
to remain stable from survey to survey so we can observe
their evolution over time, yet it is likely that some blocks
will cease to respond, either becoming ﬁrewalled, removed,
or simply unused due to renumbering.
Our sampling methodology attempts to balance these
goals by using three different policies to select blocks
to survey: unchanging/random, unchanging/spaced, and
novel/random. We expect these policies to allow future anal-
ysis of subsets of the data with different properties. Half
of the blocks are selected with a unchanging policy, which
means that we selected them when we began surveys in
September 2006 and retain them in future surveys. We se-
lected the unchanging set of blocks based on IT13w. A quar-
ter of all blocks (half of the unchanging blocks; unchang-
ing/random) were selected randomly from all blocks that had
any positive responses. This set is relatively unbiased (af-
fected only by our requirement that the block show some
positive response). Another quarter of all blocks (unchang-
ing/spaced) were selected to uniformly cover a range of
Dur. Alloc. ACKs NACKs Prohib.
Name Start Date (days) (×109) (×106) (×106) (×106)
ICMP1 2003-06-01 117 2.52 51.08 n/a n/a
ICMP2 2003-10-08 191 2.52 51.52 n/a n/a
TCP1 2003-11-20 120 2.52 52.41 n/a n/a
IT1 2004-06-21 70 2.40 57.49 n/a n/a
IT2 2004-08-30 70 2.40 59.53 n/a n/a
IT4 2005-01-05 42 2.43 63.15 n/a n/a
IT5 2005-02-25 42 2.43 66.10 n/a n/a
IT6 2005-07-01 47 2.65 69.89 n/a n/a
IT7 2005-09-02 67 2.65 74.40 46.52 17.33
IT9 2005-12-14 31 2.65 73.88 49.04 15.81
IT11w 2006-03-07 24 2.70 95.76 53.4* 17.84
IT12w 2006-04-13 24 2.70 96.80 52.2* 16.94
IT13w 2006-06-16 32 2.70 101.54 77.11 17.86
IT14w 2006-09-14 32 2.75 101.17 51.17 16.40
IT15w 2006-11-08 62 2.82 102.96 84.44 14.73
IT16w 2007-02-14 50 2.90 104.77 65.32 14.49
IT17w 2007-05-29 52 2.89 112.25 66.05 16.04
Table 1: IPv4 address space allocation (alloc.) and re-
sponses over time (positive and negative acknowledgments,
and NACKs that indicate administrative prohibition), Cen-
suses before September 2005 did not record NACKs.
availabilities and volitilities (approximating the A,U-values
deﬁned in Section 2.4). This unchanging/spaced quarter is
therefore not randomly selected, but instead ensures that
unusual blocks are represented in survey data, from fully-
populated, always up server farms to frequently changing,
dynamically-addressed areas.
The other half of all blocks (novel/random) are selected
randomly, for each survey, from the set of /24 blocks that
responded in the last census. This selection method has a
bias to active portions of the address space, but is otherwise
unbiased. Selection from previously active blocks means we
do not see “births” of newly used blocks in our survey data,
but it reduces probing of unused or unrouted space. In spite
of these techniques, we actually see a moderately large num-
ber (27%) of unresponsive blocks in our surveys, suggesting
address usage is constantly evolving.
Since all blocks for surveys are drawn from blocks that re-
sponded previously, our selection process should be slightly
biased to over-represent responsiveness. In addition, one
quarter of blocks (unchanging/spaced) are selected non-
randomly, perhaps skewing results to represent “unusual”
blocks. Since most of the Internet blocks are sparsely pop-
ulated (see Figure 2) we believe this also results in a slight
overestimate. Studies of subsets of the data are future work.
How long: We collect surveys for periods of about one
week. This duration is long enough to capture daily cycles,
yet not burden the target address blocks. We plan to expand
collection to 14 days to capture two weekend cycles.
Datasets: Table 2 lists the surveys we have conducted to
date, including general surveys and ICMP-nmap
survey
USC used
for validation in Section 3.2. We began taking surveys well
after our initial censuses. These datasets are available from
the authors and have already been used by several external
organizations.Duration /24 Blocks
Name Start Date (days) probed respond.
IT
survey
14w 2006-03-09 6 260 217
IT
survey
15w 2006-11-08 7 24,008 17,528
IT
survey
16w 2007-02-16 7 24,007 20,912
IT
survey
17w 2007-06-01 12 24,007 20,866
ICMP-nmap
survey
USC 2007-08-13 9 768 299
Table 2: Summary of surveys conducted.
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Figure 2: Density of /24 address blocks in survey IT
survey
15w ,
grouped by percentile-binned block availability and uptime.
2.4 Metrics
To characterize the visible Internet we deﬁne two metrics:
availability (A) and uptime (U). We deﬁne address availabil-
ity, A(addr) as the fraction of time a host at an address re-
sponds positively. We deﬁne address uptime, U(addr), as
the mean duration for which the address has a continuous
positive response, normalized by the duration of probing in-
terval. This value approximates host uptime, although we
cannot differentiate between an address occupied by a single
host and one ﬁlled by a succession of different responsive
hosts. It also assumes each probe is representative of the ad-
dress’s responsiveness until the next probe. The (A,U) pair
reﬂects address usage: (0.5,0.5) corresponds to an address
that responds for the ﬁrst half of the measurement period but
is down the second half, while (0.5,0.1) could be up every
other day for ten days of measurement.
We also deﬁne block availability and uptime, or A(block)
and U(block), as the mean A(addr) and U(addr) for all ad-
dresses in the block that are ever responsive.
By deﬁnition, A(block) is an estimate of the fraction of
addresses that are up in that block. If addresses in a block
follow a consistent allocation policy, it is also the probability
that any responsive address is occupied.
Both A and U are deﬁned for surveys and censuses. In
censuses, the probe interval of months is protracted enough
to be considered a rough, probabilistic estimate rather than
an accurate measurement. Infrequent samples are particu-
larly problematic in computing U(addr) over censuses; we
therefore focus on U(addr) from surveys, where the sam-
pling rate is a better match for actual host uptimes.
These measures are also not completely orthogonal, since
large values of U can occur only for large values of A and
small values of A correspond to small values of U. In fact,
U = A/NU where NU is the number of uptime periods. Fi-
nally, taking the mean of all addresses in a /24 block may
aggregate nodes with different functions or under different
administrative entities.
To illustrate these metrics and their relationship, Figure 2
shows a density plot of these values for responding blocks
from IT
survey
15w . We show density by counting blocks in each
cell of a 100×100 grid. Most of the probability mass is
near (A,U) = (0,0) and along the U ≃ 0 line, suggesting
sparsely populated subnets where most addresses are un-
available. Figures showing alternative representations of this
data are available in Appendix C.
3 Understanding the Methodology
Before evaluating the visible Internet, we ﬁrst evaluate
our methodology. Any form of active probing of a system as
large and complex as the Internet must be imperfect, since
the Internet will change before we can complete a snapshot.
Our goal is therefore to understand and quantify sources of
error, ideally minimizing them and ensuring that they are not
biased. We therefore review inherent limitations of active
probing, then consider and quantify four potential sources
of inaccuracy: probe protocol, measurement location, multi-
homed hosts, and packet loss.
Figure 1 relates what we can measure to classes of edge
computers. Our methodology counts the large hatched area,
and estimates most the white areas representing sources of
error in our measurement. Since we have no way of observ-
ing computers that are never on-line, we focus on computers
that are sometime on the Internet (the left box). This class is
divided into three horizontal bands: visible computers (top
cross-hatch), computers that are visible, but not to our probe
protocol (middle white box, estimated in Section 3.2), and
invisible computers (bottom white box; Section 3.2.1). In
addition, we consider computers with static and dynamic
addresses (left and right halves). Finally, subsets of these
may be generally available, but down at probe time (cen-
tral dashed oval; Section 3.5), frequently unavailable (right
dashed box), or double counted (“router” oval; Section 3.4).
3.1 Active Probing and Invisible Hosts
The most signiﬁcant limitation of our approach is that we
canonlyseethevisibleInternet. Hoststhatarehiddenbehind
ICMP-dropping ﬁrewalls and in private address space (be-
hind NATs) are completely missed; NAT boxes appear to be
at most a single occupied address. While IETF requires that
hosts respond to pings [4], many ﬁrewalls, including those in
Windows XP SP1 and Vista, drop pings. On the other hand,
such hosts are often placed behind ping-responsive routers
or NAT devices.
While an OS-level characterization of the Internet is an
open problem, in the next section we provide very strong es-
timates of estimate measurement error for USC, and an eval-uationofarandom sampleofInternetaddresses. InSection 6
we look at visible ﬁrewall deployment. Studies of server
logs, such as that of Xie et al. [50], may complement our
approaches and can provide insight into NATed hosts since
web logs of widely used services can see through NATs. Ul-
timately, a complete evaluation of the invisible Internet is an
area of future work.
Network operators choose what to ﬁrewall and whether
to block the protocols used in our probes. Blocking reduces
our estimates, biasing them in favor of under-reporting us-
age. This bias is probably greater at sites that place greater
emphasis on security. While we study the effects of ﬁrewalls
and quantify that in the next section, our overall conclusions
focus on the visible Internet.
3.2 Choice of Protocol for Active Probing
We have observed considerable skepticism that ICMP
probing can measure active hosts, largely out of fears that
it is widely ﬁltered by ﬁrewalls. While no method of active
probing will detect a host that refuses to answer any query,
we next compare ICMP and TCP as alternative mechanisms.
We validate ICMP probing by examining two populations.
First, at USC we use both active probes and passive trafﬁc
observation to estimate active addresses. University policies
may differ from the general Internet, so we then compare
ICMP- and TCP-based probing for a random sample of ad-
dresses drawn from the entire Internet.
3.2.1 Evaluation at USC
We ﬁrst compare ICMP- and TCP-based probing on a
week-long survey ICMP-nmap
survey
USC of all 81,664 addresses
and about 50,000 students and staff at USC, comparing pas-
sive observation of all trafﬁc with TCP and ICMP probing.
Our ICMP methodology is described in Section 2.2, with
complete scans every 11 minutes. We compare this approach
to TCP-based active probing and passive monitoring as de-
scribed by Bartlett et al. [2]. TCP-based active probing uses
Nmap applied to ports for HTTP, HTTPS, MySQL, FTP, and
SSH, taken every 12 hours. For TCP probes, Nmap regards
both SYN-ACK and RST responses as indication of host
presence. Passive monitoring observes nearly all network
trafﬁc between our target network and its upstream, commer-
cial peers. It declares an IP address active when it appears
as the source address in any UDP packet or a non-SYN TCP
packet. We checked for IP addresses that generate only TCP
SYNs on the assumption that they are spoofed source ad-
dresses from SYN-ﬂood attacks; we found none.
Table 3 quantiﬁes detection completeness, normalized to
detection by any method (the union of passive and active
methods, middle column), and detection by any form of
active probing (right column). We also show hosts found
uniquely be each method in the last rows (ICMP, TCP, and
passiveonly). Detectionbyanymeans (theunionofthethree
methods) represents the best available ground truth (USC
does not maintain a central list of used addresses), but pas-
sive methods are not applicable to the general Internet, so
the right column represents best-possible practical wide-area
results as we use in the next section.
First, weconsidertheabsoluteaccuracy ofeachapproach.
When we compare to ground truth as deﬁned by all three
category: any active
addresses probed 81,664
non-responding 54,078
responding any 27,586 100%
ICMP or TCP 19,866 72% 100%
ICMP 17,054 62% 86%
TCP 14,794 54% 74%
Passive 25,706 93%
ICMP only 656
TCP only 1,081
Passive only 7,720
Table 3: Comparison of ICMP, Nmap, and passive observa-
tion of address utilization at USC.
category: active
addresses probed 1,000,000
non-responding 945,703
responding either 54,297 100%
ICMP 40,033 74%
TCP 34,182 62%
both ICMP and TCP 19,918
ICMP only 20,115
TCP only 14,264
Table 4: ICMP-TCP comparison for random Internet ad-
dresses.
methods, we see that active methods signiﬁcantly under-
count active IP addresses, with TCP missing 46% and ICMP
missing 38%. While this result conﬁrms that ﬁrewalls sig-
niﬁcantly reduce the effectiveness of active probing, it shows
that active probing can ﬁnd the majority of used addresses.
Second, we can compare the relative accuracy of ICMP
and TCP as types of active probing. We see that ICMP is
noticeably more effective than TCP-based probing. While
some administrators apparently regard ICMP as a security
threat, others recognize its value as a debugging tool.
Our experiment used different probe frequencies for
ICMP and TCP. This choice was forced because Nmap is
much slower than our optimized ICMP prober. However,
when we correct for this difference by selecting only ICMP
surveys every 12 hours, ICMP coverage only falls slightly,
to 59% of any responders, or 84% of active responders. We
therefore conclude that coverage is dominated by the type of
probing, not probe frequency.
3.2.2 Evaluation from a Random Internet Sample
Our USC dataset provides a well-deﬁned ground truth,
but it may be biased by local or academic-speciﬁc policies.
To remove possible bias we next consider a survey of a
random sample of one million allocated Internet addresses
taken in October, 2007. Details of the methodology (omitted
here due to space constraints) are in Appendix B. Brieﬂy,
we compare one-shot TCP SYN probes to port 80 to ICMP
probes. (Absence of public, unanonymized traces leave ad-
ditional wide-area evaluation as future work.)
Table 4 shows the results of this experiment. If we de-ﬁne addresses that respond to either ICMP or TCP as ground
truth of visible address usage, we can then evaluate accuracy
of detection of active addresses relative to this ground truth.
These results show that trafﬁc ﬁltering is more widespread
in the Internet than at USC, since both ICMP and TCP re-
sponse rates are lower (74% and 62% compared to 86% and
74% when we use the same baseline). This experiment con-
ﬁrms, however, that qualitatively, ICMP is more accurate
than TCP-based probing, ﬁnding 74% of active addresses,
11% closer to our baseline. We conclude that both ICMP
and TCP port 80 are ﬁltered by ﬁrewalls, but ICMP is less
likely to be ﬁltered.
3.2.3 Implications on Estimates
We draw several conclusions from these validation ex-
periments. First, they show that active probing consider-
ably underestimates Internet utilization—single protocol ac-
tive probing misses about one-third to one-half of all active
addresses from our USC experiment. When we consider vis-
ible addresses (those that will respond to some type of ac-
tive probe), single-protocol active probing underestimates by
one-third to one-sixth of hosts from both experiments.
Our results suggest that, while hosts block one protocol
or the other, multi-protocol probing can discover more ac-
tive addresses than single protocol probing. The experiments
also show that ICMP-only probing is consistently more ac-
curate than TCP-only probing. Our operational experience
is that TCP probing elicits 30 times more abuse complaints
than ICMP. Since the resulting “please-do-not-probe” black-
lists would skew results, we believe ICMP is justiﬁed as the
best feasible instrument for wide-area active probing.
Finally, we would like to estimate a correction factor to
account for our count underestimate due to ﬁrewalls. Since
ICMP-nmap
survey
USC provides the best ground truth, including
passive observations that are not affected by ﬁrewalls, we
claim our ICMP estimates are 38% low. A factor 1.61 would
therefore scale the ICMP-responsive count to estimate Inter-
net accessible computers (Figure 1), if one accepts USC as
representative. If one assumes USC is more open than the
Internet as whole, this scaling factor will underestimate.
Alternatively, we can derive a less biased estimate of the
visible Internet (a subset of Internet-accessible computers
shown in Figure 1). Our random sample suggests that ICMP
misses 26% of TCP responsive hosts, so visible computers
should be 1.35× the number of ICMP-responsive hosts. As a
second step, we then scale from visible to Internet-accessible
addresses by comparing TCP or ICMP to the responding any
measure from ICMP-nmap
survey
USC , a factor of 1.38×. (As de-
scribed above, this estimate is likely low, and as future work
we hope to improve it.) Together, these suggest an alterna-
tive multiplier of 1.86 to get Internet-accessible computers.
3.3 Measurement Location
Measurement location is an additional possible source of
bias. It may be that some locations may provide a poor view
ofparts oftheInternet, perhaps due toconsistentlycongested
links or incomplete routing.
To rule out this source of potential bias, censuses since
March 2006 have been done in pairs from two different lo-
cations in Los Angeles and Arlington, Virginia. These sites
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Figure 3: Subnets’ A values from two censuses taken from
widely different network locations: IT11w and IT11e.
have completely different network connectivity and Internet
service providers. We use different seeds at each site so
probe order varies, but the censuses are started concurrently.
Figure 3 compares the A(block) values measured concur-
rentlyfromeachvantagepointinadensityplot. Asexpected,
the vast majority of blocks are near x = y, but for a few out-
liers. Multiple metrics comparing A(block) from these sites
support that results are independent of location: the PDF of
this difference appears Gaussian, where 96% of values agree
within ±0.05, and correlation coefﬁcient is 0.99999.
3.4 Multi-homed hosts and Routers
We generally assume that each host occupies only a single
IP address, and so each responsive address implies a respon-
sive host. This assumption is violated in two cases: some
hosts and all routers have multiple public network interfaces,
and some hosts use different addresses at different times. If
using a census to estimate hosts (not just addresses), we need
to account for this potential source of overcounting.
Multiple public IP addresses for a single host are known
as aliases in Internet mapping literature [13]; several tech-
niques have been developed for alias resolution to determine
when two IP addresses belong to the same host [13, 45].
One such technique is based on the fact that some multi-
homed hosts or routers can receive a probe-packet on one
interface and reply using a source address of the other [13].
The source address is either ﬁxed or determined by routing.
This behavior is known to be implementation-speciﬁc.
Because it can be applied retroactively, this technique is
particularly suitable for large-scale Internet probing. Rather
than sending additional probes, we re-examine our existing
traces with the Mercator alias resolution algorithm to ﬁnd
responses sent from addresses different than were probed.
We carried out this analysis with census IT15w and found that
6.7 million addresses responded from a different address, a
surprisingly large 6.5% of the 103M total responses.
In addition to hosts withmultiple concurrent IPaddresses,
many hosts have multiple sequential IP addresses, either
because of associations with different DHCP servers due
to mobility, or assignment of different addresses from oneserver. In general, we cannot track this since we only
know address occupancy and not the occupying host iden-
tity. However, Section 5.1 suggests that occupancy of ad-
dresses is quite short. Further work is needed to understand
the impact of hosts that take on multiple IP addresses over
time, perhaps using log analysis from large services [50, 25].
3.5 Probe Loss
An important limitation of our current methodology is our
inability to distinguish between host unavailability and probe
loss. Probes may be lost in several places: in the LAN or an
early router near the probing machine, in the general Inter-
net, or near the destination. In this section, we examine how
lost probes affect observed availability and the distribution
of A(addr) and A(block).
We minimize chances of probe loss near the probing ma-
chines in two different ways. First, we rate-limit outgoing
probes to so that it is unlikely that we overrun nearby routers
buffers. Second, our probers checkpoint their state period-
ically and so we are able to stop and resume probing for
known local outages. In one occasion we detected a local
outage after-the-fact, and we corrected for this by redoing
the probe period corresponding to the outage.
We expect three kinds of potential loss in the network
and at the far edge: occasional loss due to congestion, burst
losses due to routing changes [27] or edge network outages,
and burst losses due to ICMP rate-limiting at the destina-
tion’s last-hop router. We depend on probing in pseudo-
random order to mitigate the penalty of loss (Section 2.1).
With the highest probe rate to any /24 block of one probe
every 2–3 seconds in a survey, or 9 hours for a census, rate
limiting should not come into play. In addition, with a cen-
sus, probes are spaced much further apart than any kind of
short-term congestion or routing instability, so we rule out
burst losses for censuses, leaving only random loss.
Random loss is of concern because the effect of loss is to
skew the data towards a lower availability. This skew differs
fromsurveys of humans where non-response isapparent, and
where non-responses may be distributed equally in the posi-
tive and negative directions. Prior studies of TCP suggest we
should expect random loss rates of a few percent (for exam-
ple, 90% of connections have 5% loss or less [1]).
We account for loss differently in censuses and surveys.
For censuses, data collection is so sparse that loss recovery is
not possible. Instead, we reduce the effect of loss on analy-
sis by focusing on A(block) rather than A(addr), since a few,
random losses have less impact when averaged over an entire
block. For surveys, we attempt to detect and repair random
probe loss through a k-repair process. We assume that a ran-
dom outage causes up to n consecutive probes to be lost. We
repair losses of up to k-consecutive probes by searching for
two positive responses separated by up to k non-responses,
and replacing this gap with assumed positive responses. We
can then compare A(addr) values with and without k-repair;
clearly A(addr) with k-repair will be higher than without.
Figure 4 shows how much k-repair changes measured
A(addr) values for IT
survey
15w . Larger values of k result in
greater changes to A(addr); but the change is fairly small: it
changes by at most 10% with 1-repair. We also observe that
the change is largest for intermediate A(addr) values (0.4
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Figure 4: Distribution of differences between the k-repair
estimate and non-repaired IT
survey
15w .
to 0.8). This skew is because in our deﬁnition of A, highly
available addresses (A(addr) > 0.8) have very few outages
to repair, while rarely available addresses (A(addr) < 0.4)
have long-lasting outages that cannot be repaired.
Finally, although we focused on how loss affects A(addr)
and A(block), it actually has a stronger effect on U(addr).
Recall thatU measures the continuous uptime of an address.
A host up continuously d0 days has a U(addr) = 1, but a
brief outage anywhere after d1 days of monitoring gives a
mean uptime of (d1 +(d0 −d1))/2 days and a normalized
U(addr) = 0.5, and a second outage reduces U(addr) =
0.33. While k-repair reduces this effect, reductions in U
caused by moderate outages are inherent in this metric.
Unless otherwise speciﬁed, we use 1-repair for our survey
data in the remainder of the paper.
4 Evaluating Methodology Parameters
We have described our approaches to taking a census and
survey of Internet address usage. They trade off the complete
spatial coverage provided by a census for covering a smaller
area with ﬁner temporal resolution with a survey. In this
section we look at those tradeoffs and their basis in sampling
theory, evaluating how varying temporal or spatial coverage
affects our observations.
4.1 Sampling in Time
As Internet addresses can be probed at different rates, we
would like to know how the probe rate affects the ﬁdelity
of our measurements. Increasing the sampling rate, while
keeping the observation time constant, should give us more
samples and hence a more detailed picture. However, probes
that are much more frequent than changes to the underlying
phenomena being measured provide little additional beneﬁt,
and limited network bandwidth at the source and target ar-
gue for moderating the probe rate. Unfortunately, we do not
necessarily know the timescale of Internet address usage. In
this section we therefore evaluate the effect of changing the
measurement timescale on our A(addr) metric.
To examine what effect the sampling interval has on the
ﬁdelity of our metrics, we simulate different probe rates by
decimating IT
survey
15w . We treat the complete dataset with 11-
minute probing as ground truth, then throw away every other 0
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Figure 5: Effect of downsampling ﬁne timescale A(addr).
Data from IT
survey
15w .
sample to halve the effective sampling rate. Applying this
process repeatedly gives exponentially coarser sampling in-
tervals, allowing us to simulate the effects of less frequent
measurements on our estimates.
Figure 5 shows the results of two levels of downsampling
for every address that responds in our ﬁne timescale survey.
In the ﬁgure, each address is shown as a dot with coordi-
nates representing its accessibility at the ﬁnest time scale (x-
axis) and also at a coarser timescale (the y-axis). If a coarser
sample provided exactly the same information as ﬁner sam-
ples we would see a straight line, while a larger spread in-
dicates error caused by coarser sampling. We observe that
this spread grows as sample interval grows. In addition, as
sampling rates decrease, data collects into bands, because n
probes can only distinguish A-values with precision 1/n.
While these graphs provide evidence that sparser sam-
pling increases the level of error, they do not directly quan-
tify that relationship. To measure this value, we group ad-
dresses into bins based on their A(addr) value at the ﬁnest
timescale, then compute the standard deviation of A(addr)
values in each bin as we reduce the number of samples per
address. This approach quantiﬁes the divergence from our
ground-truth ﬁnest timescale values as we sample at coarser
resolutions. Figure 6 shows these standard deviations for a
range of sample timescales, plotted by points. As expected,
coarser sampling corresponds to wider variation in the mea-
surement compared to the true value; this graph quantiﬁes
that relationship. We see that the standard deviation is the
greatest for addresses with middle values of A (local maxi-
mum around A = 0.6) and signiﬁcantly less at the extreme
values of A = 0 and A = 1.
To place these values into context, assume for a moment
that address occupancy is strictly probabilistic, and that an
address is present with probability p. Thus E(A(addr)) = p,
and each measurement can be considered a random vari-
able X taking values one or zero when the host responds
(with probability p) or is non-responsive (with probability
1− p). With n samples, we expect np positive results, and
ˆ A(addr) will follow a binomial distribution with standard de-
viation
p
np(1− p). On these assumptions, we can place
error bounds on the measurement: our estimates should be
within ˆ A(addr)±1.645
p
ˆ p(1− ˆ p)/n for a 90% conﬁdence
interval; we show these estimates on Figure 6 as lines. We
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15w ) as a function of
ground truth A(addr) metric (from IT
survey
15w ) overlayed with
theoretical curves
p
A(1−A)/n.
canseethatthemeasuredvarianceisnearlyalwaysbelowthe
theoretical prediction. This reduction is potentially caused
by correlation in availability between hosts in same block.
The prediction becomes more and more accurate as we in-
crease the time scale and samples become more “random”,
approaching the binomial distribution.
These results assume our measurements are unbiased.
This assumption is not strictly true, but Section 3 suggests
that bias is generally small.
4.2 Sampling in Space
We can survey an increasing number of addresses, but
only at a diminishing rate. In the extreme case of our cen-
sus, we probe every address only once every several months.
Data so sparse makes interpretation of uptime highly sus-
pect, because measurements are taken much less frequently
than the known arrival and departure rates of hosts such as
mobile computers. Much more frequent sampling is pos-
sible when a smaller fraction of the Internet is considered,
however this step introduces sampling error. In this section
we review the statistics of population surveys to understand
how this affects our results. The formulae below are from
Hedayat and Sinha [17]; we refer interested readers there.
In ﬁnding the proportion of a population that meets some
criteria, such as the mean A(addr) values for the Internet, we
draw on two prior results of simple random sampling. First,
a sample of size n approximates the true A with variance
V( ˆ A) ≃ A(1−A)/n (provided the total population is large,
as it is in the case of the IPv4 address space). Second, we
can estimate the margin of error d with conﬁdence 1−α/2
for a given measurement as:
d = zα/2
p
A(1−A)/n (1)
when the population is large, where zα/2 is a constant that
selects conﬁdence level (1.65 for 95% conﬁdence).
Second, when estimating a non-binary parameter of the
population, suchasmeanA(block)valuefortheInternetwith
a sample of size n, the variance of the estimated mean isV( ¯ A(block)) = S2
¯ A(block)/n, where S2
¯ A(block) is the true pop-
ulation variance.
These results from population sampling inform our Inter-
net measurements: by controlling the sample size we can
control the variance and margin of error of our estimate. We
use this theoretical result in Section 5.2 to bound sampling
error at less than 0.4% for response estimates of our surveys.
5 Estimating the Size of the Internet
Having established our methodology, we now use it to
estimate the size of the Internet. While this question seems
simple to pose, it is more difﬁcult to make precise. Our goal
istoestimatethenumberofhoststhatcanaccesstheInternet,
yet doing so requires careful control of sources of error.
Figure 1 divides the Internet address space into several
categories, and we have quantiﬁed the effects of protocol
choice (Section 3.2) and invisible hosts (Section 3.2.1), our
largest sources of undercounting. Section 3.4 also accounts
for a overcounting due to routers.
Having quantiﬁed most sources of error, we can therefore
estimate the size of the Internet through two sub-problems:
estimating the number of hosts that use dynamic addresses
and the number that use static addresses. We must under-
stand dynamic address usage because dynamic addresses
represent a potential source of both over- or under-counting.
Dynamic addresses may be reused by multiple hosts over
time, and they may go unused when an intermittently con-
nected host, such as a laptop or dial-up computer, is ofﬂine.
Unfortunately, we cannot yet quantify how many ad-
dresses are allocated dynamically to multiple hosts. The
topic has only recently begun to be explored [50, 25]; to this
existing study we add an analysis of duration of address oc-
cupancy (Section 5.1). Here we focus on evaluating the size
of the static, visible Internet (Section 5.2).
While we cannot quantify how many computers are ever
on the Internet, we can deﬁne an Internet address snap-
shot as whatever computers are on-line at any instant. Our
census captures this snapshot, modulo packet loss and non-
instantaneous measurement time. We can then project trends
in Internet address use by evaluating how snapshots change
over time (Section 5.3), at least to the extent the snapshot
population tracks the entire Internet host population.
5.1 Duration of Address Occupancy
We next use our address surveys to estimate how many In-
ternet addresses are used dynamically. There are many rea-
sonstoexpectthatmosthostsontheInternetaredynamically
addressed, since many end-user computers use dynamic ad-
dresses, either because they are mobile and change addresses
based on location, or because ISPs encourage dynamic ad-
dresses (often to discourage home servers, or provide static
addressing as a value- and fee-added service). In addition,
hosts that are regularly turned off show the same pattern of
intermittent address occupation.
Figure 7 shows distribution of address and block uptimes
(with 1-repair as explained in Section 3.5) from IT
survey
15w . This
data shows that the vast majority of addresses are not par-
ticularly stable, and are occupied only for a fraction of the
observation time. We see that 50% of addresses are occu-
pied for 81 minutes or less. A small fraction of addresses,
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however, are quite stable, with about 3% up almost all of our
week-long survey, and another 8% showing only a few (1 to
3) brief outages. Our values are signiﬁcantly less than a me-
dian occupancy value of around a day as previously reported
by Xie et al. [50]; both studies have different kinds of selec-
tion bias and a detailed study of these differences is future
work. On the other hand, our results are very close to the
the median occupancy of 75 minutes per address reported at
Georgia Tech [25]. Since our survey is a sample of 1% of the
Internet, it generalizes their results to the general Internet.
5.2 Estimating the Size of the Stable Internet
and Servers
We next turn to estimating the size of the static Internet.
Since we can only detect address usage or absence, we ap-
proximate the static Internet with the stable Internet. This
approach underestimates the static Internet, since some hosts
always use the same addresses, but do so intermittently.
We ﬁrst must deﬁne stability. Figure 8 shows the cumu-
lative density function of A for addresses and different size
blocks, computed over survey IT
survey
15w (other surveys are sim-
ilar). We deﬁne addresses with 95% availability or better tobe very stable addresses, concluding that this data suggests
that 16.4% of responsive addresses in the survey are very
stable and corresponds to the mode of addresses with avail-
abilities at A > 0.95.
We can next project this estimate to the whole Internet
with two methods. First, we extrapolate from the survey to
the whole-Internet census. Our survey ﬁnds 1.75M respon-
sive addresses in 17.5k responsive /24 blocks, suggesting a
mean of 16.4 stable addresses per responsive block. The cor-
responding census ﬁnds 2.1M responsive blocks, suggesting
an upper bound of 34.4M stable, occupied addresses in the
entire Internet. This estimated upper bound depends on map-
ping between survey and census.
Second, we can project directly from our census. Given
103M responsive addresses in our census, we estimate that
16.4% of these, or 16.8M addresses, are potentially very sta-
ble. However, this estimate does not account for the fact that
our survey was biased (by only choosing to survey previ-
ously responsive blocks, and blocks selected from a range of
A,U values), and our survey is much more robust to packet
loss, since each address is probed more than 916 times over
a week-long survey rather than once in the three month cen-
sus. We therefore consider our ﬁrst estimate to be an upper
bound on the size of the visible Internet.
We next list and quantify several potential sources of er-
ror in this estimate. Section 3.2.3 suggested that multipli-
ers of 1.61 or 1.86 are our best projections from the ICMP-
responsive Internet to Internet accessible computers. Next,
multi-homed hosts or routers represent an overcount of at
most 6% of addresses (Section 3.4). Third, some addresses
were not stable because they were newly occupied mid-way
through our census. We estimated births in survey data and
found it to account for less than 1% of addresses. Statis-
tical measurement error due to sample size is about 0.4%
(Equation 1). Taken together, these factors suggest an error-
corrected estimated of 52M to 60M very stable addresses on
the public Internet.
Finally, there is a loose relationship between stable ad-
dresses and servers on the Internet; we study hosts that serve
web, MySQL, ftp, and ssh in Appendix A. That study sug-
gests that, at USC, 58% of stable addresses are not servers
(presumably they are always-on client machines), and that
there are about 1.5× more servers than servers at stable ad-
dresses. (In other words, half of the servers we found were
down more than 5% of the time!) Examination of DNS
records suggests that many of these non-stable servers are
simply not traditional servers—they are either dynamic hosts
that happen to be running web servers, or embedded devices
that are turned off at night.
5.3 Trends in Internet Address Utilization
Since the IPv4 address space is ﬁnite and limited to 32
bits, the rate of address allocation is important. In fact, con-
cerns about address space exhaustion [15] were the primary
motivation for IPv6 [6] and CIDR [11] as an interim conser-
vation strategy. They also motivated deployment of Network
Address Translation (NAT) devices that allow many comput-
ers to share a single globally routable address [48]. We next
consider how effective conservation of address space alloca-
tion has been 20 years after these initial studies.
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Figure 9: IPv4 address space allocation and utilization over
time. Solid lines indicate absolute values, dashed are per-
centages of allocated addresses. (Data from all censuses.)
Figure 9 and Table 1 show trends in address space alloca-
tion and utilization computed over each individual Internet
address. To put these values into context, around 4.3 billion
addresses are possible, after eliminating private and multi-
cast address space, only 2.8 billion public unicast addresses
are allocated. Finally, this evaluation represents the number
of addresses and not actual host computers, since multiple
computers may be hidden behind a single NAT box.
Linear regression shows that allocation is growing at
about 106M/year, (about 4% annually since 2004), and the
number of visible addresses grows at 17.2M/year (28% of
the 2004 baseline).
Care must be taking in interpreting these results, though,
because address allocation is far from uniform. Many ISPs
give out individual addresses to users, but these addresses
are usually dynamic and change over time. Even users
of “always-on” connections may shift addresses over time.
Businesses and ISPs, on the other hand, are given addresses
in power-of-two blocks, which are rarely ﬁlled.
6 Trends in Firewall Deployment
Large numbers of Internet hosts lie behind ﬁrewalls,
which are conﬁgured to restrict, block or rate-limit trafﬁc
according to private local policies. Firewalls clearly affect
the visibility of hosts to censuses. In this section, we study
trends in the deployment of visible ﬁrewalls over 15 months
to begin to understand their effect on our observations.
Counting hosts behind ﬁrewalls is difﬁcult since the goal
of a ﬁrewall is often to shield hosts from external ac-
cess. Measuring ﬁrewalls themselves is also difﬁcult be-
cause many ﬁrewalls simply drop packets, making them in-
visible to our probing. Some ﬁrewalls, however, respond to
ICMP echo requests with negative acknowledgments, indi-
cating that communication is “administratively prohibited”.
We use this information to estimate the number of ﬁrewalls
and ﬁrewalled addresses.
We begin with some terminology and deﬁnitions. We de-
ﬁneaﬁrewallasasoftwareorhardwaredevicethatintention-
ally hides from our probes an active network interface thatis otherwise connected to the public Internet and assigned
a public IP address. (Since our focus is the public Inter-
net, we do not attempt to count hosts behind NATs with pri-
vate IP addresses.) A ﬁrewall intercepts packets before they
reach their destinations. Firewalls include access-controls in
routers, dedicated boxes, and end-host software. With regard
to our probes, silent ﬁrewalls discard the probe without reply,
while visible ﬁrewalls generate a reply that indicates commu-
nication is administratively prohibited. Access-control lists
in routers are one implementation of visible ﬁrewalls. Many
host operating systems include a software ﬁrewall that pro-
tects a single machine. We call these personal ﬁrewalls, in
contrast to block ﬁrewalls which are typically implemented
by routers, PCs or dedicated appliances and cover a block of
addresses. When appropriate, we use the term ﬁrewall for all
these different devices and software.
In this section, we use censuses to count the visible
ﬁrewalls in the Internet, both personal and block ﬁrewalls,
and estimate the address space they cover. Because we
miss silent ﬁrewalls, these measurements provide only lower
bounds of all ﬁrewalls. Finally, we analyze trends in ﬁrewall
deployment over a 15-month period covered by censuses IT7
through IT15w (all censuses that recorded NACKs).
6.1 Methodology
To count ﬁrewalls we subdivide the negative replies to a
census. We consider responses of type 3, destination un-
reachable, with code 9, 10, and 13, indicating network, host
or communication administratively prohibited. to indicate
the presence of a visible ﬁrewall. We then compare the
probed address P to the source address of the reply message
R. When P = R, the host itself replied, and so we classify
P as a personal ﬁrewall. When P  = R, we conclude that
a block ﬁrewall with address R replied on P’s behalf. We
also consider a positive response (echo reply) or a negative
response that is not administrative prohibited, to be a non-
ICMP-ﬁrewalled address. In other cases, we cannot draw a
conclusion about the presence of a ﬁrewall, since the address
may be invisibly ﬁrewalled, the address may be empty, or the
probe may have been lost.
To measure coverage, we examine all probed addresses
Pi with the same reply address R to determine the ﬁrewalled
block covered by ﬁrewall R. A block ﬁrewalled by R is the
largest [l,h] address range such that l and h elicit an admin-
istratively prohibited reply, and ∀ p ∈ [l,h], replies to probes
to address p are either administratively prohibited from R,
or a positive reply (echo reply, type 0) from p, or there is
no response from p. We also require h−l < 216, and con-
ﬁrmed that this step avoids degenerate cases. This deﬁnition
of ﬁrewalled blocks tolerates lost probes (by ignoring non-
responses) and considers the common practice of allowing a
few publicly-visible hosts (often web servers) in the middle
of an otherwise ﬁrewalled range of addresses.
We analyze our censuses to estimate the number of ﬁre-
walled addresses, the number of ﬁrewalled blocks, their dis-
tribution by size and their evolution over time.
6.2 Evaluation
We begin by considering the size of the ﬁrewalled address
space. Figure 10 shows the absolute number of addresses
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Figure 10: Number of addresses protected by visible ﬁre-
walls (including personal ﬁrewalls), in absolute terms (left
scale) and in ratio to responsive, non-ﬁrewalled addresses.
(Data from IT7 through IT17w.)
protected by visible ﬁrewalls (left axis and bottom line), and
the ratio of that count to the number of responsive addresses
(right axis and top line). The number of ﬁrewalled addresses
is then the sum of the size of all ﬁrewalled blocks.
We see nearly 40M addresses protected by visible ﬁre-
walls. The visibly ﬁrewalled space is a very small fraction
of the allocated address space (about 1.5% of 2.6B–2.8B ad-
dresses). The ﬁrewalled address space is, surprisingly, rela-
tively stable over three years of observation. However, when
we compare the ratio of addresses protected by visible ﬁre-
walls to the number of responsive, non-ﬁrewalled addresses,
we see a downward trend. In mid-2005, there was 1 visibly
ﬁrewalled address for every 2 responsive addresses; by the
end of 2006 this ratio had declined to nearly 1:3. We suspect
that this trend is due to an increase in the number of invisible
ﬁrewalls, but this hypothesis requires further investigation.
Turning to ﬁrewall block size, the address space covered
by each ﬁrewall, we observe between 190k and 224k per-
sonal ﬁrewalls across our surveys (not shown in our ﬁgures),
with no consistent trend over time. Personal ﬁrewalls greatly
outnumber block ﬁrewalls, 4:1. However, the block ﬁrewalls
cover more than 99% of ﬁrewalled address space.
Figure 11 shows the cumulative distribution of sizes of
ﬁrewall blocks, omitting personal ﬁrewalls. We assume that
the number of blocks corresponds to the number of block
ﬁrewalls, although it is conceivable that a single ﬁrewall may
handle multiple blocks. We see bumps at block sizes that are
powers of two, with a pronounced bump at /24, but inter-
estingly, also at /29 and /30 blocks. We also notice a slight
increase in the number of blocks over the course of our study,
mostly due to additional ﬁrewalls covering single addresses.
From these observations we make several conjectures
about trends in ﬁrewall use. Since we see little increase in
the number of ﬁrewalled hosts across our censuses, we con-
jecture that most newly deployed hosts are either visible, or
go behind silent ﬁrewalls that our methodology is unable to
account for. Given the relative stability in the number of vis- 0
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Figure 11: Cumulative distribution of ﬁrewalled blocksize.
This graph omits 190–225k personal ﬁrewalls. (Data from
IT7 through IT17w.)
ible ﬁrewalls, we conjecture that existing ﬁrewalls maintain
visibility and most new ﬁrewalls are conﬁgured to be invis-
ible. The latter may reﬂect the heightened sense of security
in new deployments, while the former the inertia in changing
existing conﬁgurations. Finally, this analysis conﬁrms ad-
ministrative structure in the Internet at sub-/24 block sizes, a
structure hidden from previous BGP-based analysis [31].
6.3 Validation
To evaluate these observations we review data from our
institution, ICMP-nmap
survey
USC . First, we extracted the 35 ﬁre-
walled blocks we detected in our university’s network. We
then conﬁrmed these detections with our network adminis-
trators, using theirknowledge of the network as ground truth.
They validated that each range we detected corresponded to
a router-level access control list, and therefore represents a
true positive. They did not ﬁnd any non-ﬁrewalls in our list,
verifying that we have no false positives. In addition, they
informally examined the block sizes that we discovered, sug-
gesting that we accurately estimated the size of 24, and were
off by a few addresses of six small blocks (sizes 4 to 27). For
overall coverage, of the 2,674 ﬁrewalled addresses we dis-
covered, operations conﬁrmed 2,639 addresses as ﬁrewalled,
and we were incorrect for 35 addresses. These small differ-
ences may be due to conﬁguration changes between obser-
vation and examination.
There are two possible classes of false negatives with our
methodology. First, invisible ﬁrewalls: we expect that the
7,720 passive-only addresses in Table 3 represent invisible
ﬁrewalled space. Our algorithm correctly classiﬁes these as
indeterminate, but this represents a limitation of our deﬁni-
tion. Second, there may be visible ﬁrewalls that we fail to
detect. Because there is no central list of ﬁrewalls at our in-
stitution, we cannot conﬁrm we completely detected all vis-
ible ﬁrewalls, but frequent probing makes omission due to
loss unlikely. While this validation is based on a single en-
terprise, these results seem quite promising.
7 Related work
To our knowledge there has been no attempt to take a
full Internet census since 1982 [41]. Smallberg’s census in
1982 was aided by an independent, central enumeration of
all hosts; our approach instead enumerates all possible IP
addresses.
We are aware of only one other active survey of addresses.
Robin Whittle surveyed the Internet address space, randomly
pinging about 0.1% of the routed space over 24 hours in
March 2007 [49]. Projecting from the positive replies, he
estimated about 107M responsive addresses, within a few
percent of our census report of 103M in IT15w four months
earlier. His results corroborate ours with a methodology like
our surveys.
He et al. use random sampling of addresses to study web
content [16]. They study the open web while we study ad-
dress usage in the visible Internet. Our study of methodology
may aid understanding the accuracy of this type of survey.
An alternative way to enumerate the Internet is to tra-
verse the domain name system. ISC has been taking cen-
suses of the reverse address space since 1994 [24]; Lottor
summarizes early work [30]. They contact name servers to
determine reverse-name mappings for addresses, rather than
contacting hosts themselves. Unlike our approach, they are
not affected directly by ﬁrewalls, but they can overcount be-
cause names may exist for addresses not in use, and under-
count, because addresses may lack reverse name mappings,
or reverse mappings not made public (perhaps for ﬁrewalled
hosts). Because their methodology is so different from ours,
the approaches are complementary and we are planning to
compare results. As one example, their January 2007 survey
found 433M reverse names, compared to the 187M respon-
sive addresses we found in the nearly contemporary IT15w.
Our active probing of edge addresses also allows new kinds
of analysis, such as our study of ﬁrewall usage.
Closest to our methodology of active probing are several
projects that measure Internet connectivity, including Rock-
etfuel [45], Mercator [13], Skitter [19], and Dimes [40]. The
primary goal of these projects is to estimate the macroscopic,
router-level connectivity of the Internet, a valuable but com-
plementary goal to ours. These projects therefore do not ex-
haustively probe edge-hosts in IP address space, but instead
use tools such as traceroute to edge addresses to collect data
about routers that make up the middle of the Internet.
Several other efforts use different approaches to also
study properties of the IP address space. First, Meng et
al. use BGP routing tables to study IPv4 address allocation
at the block level [31]. Like ours, this work is a longitu-
dinal study of address space allocation, they consider seven
years of data. However, their approach considers only block-
level information gathered from IANA and injected into the
global routing tables, not a host-level study, and they con-
sider only new blocks, not the entire IPv4 address space. Our
edge study also reveals sub-/24 structure invisible to BGP.
As another example, Kohler et al. [26] studied the struc-
ture of IP destination addresses seen through passive obser-
vations on Internet links. Their measurements were con-
ducted at a few locations that included access links to uni-
versities, ISP routers with local peerings, and a major ISP’sbackbone routers. Their data collection considered several
links, each measured for several hours, observing between
70,000 and 160,000 addresses. They discover multifractal
properties of the address structure and propose a model that
captured many properties in the observed trafﬁc. By con-
trast, our census unearthed upwards of 50 million distinct
IP addresses through active probing of addresses and so fo-
cuses more on the static properties of address usage rather
than their dynamic, trafﬁc dependent properties.
Finally, Narayan et al. propose a model of IP routing ta-
bles based on allocation and routing practices [33] , and Hus-
ton [20] and Gao et al. [5] (among others) have measured the
time evolution of BGP tables and address space. This work
focuses on BGP and routing, not the the temporal aspects of
address space usage that we consider.
Because compromised home private machines are the
source of a signiﬁcant amount of unsolicited e-mail, a num-
ber of anti-spam organizations maintain lists of dynami-
cally assigned addresses (examples include [44, 34]). This
work complements our study of the behavior of dynamic ad-
dresses, but uses primarily static or manually entered data,
or semi-automated probing in response to spam.
Recent research has explored how to detect dynamic ad-
dress space usage by examining login rates to a major on-line
e-mail hosting service [50]. As with our work they charac-
terize IP address usage, however their methodology is based
on passive monitoring of a large web service. Their work
complements ours in that they can reach strong conclusions
about the addresses that contact their service, and they can
peer behind NATs in ways we cannot, but they cannot evalu-
ate addresses that do not contact their service, limiting their
coverage to some subset of client computers in the Internet.
Much of the previous work on ﬁrewall detection has fo-
cused on discovering stealth ﬁrewalls. Early work was pub-
lished on the Phrack website [9], detecting ﬁrewalls that did
not verify checksums. Tools such as p0f [35] and nmap [38]
have options to detect a ﬁrewall either by passively monitor-
ing ﬂows or actively sending specially crafted packets and
analyzing responses. These tools are more accurate than our
approach, but much more invasive; we believe our approach
is necessary to safely study the whole Internet.
8 Future Work and Conclusions
There are several directions for future work, including re-
ﬁning the methodology, exploring probe retransmissions, ex-
ploringtime/spacetrade-offs, andimprovingourunderstand-
ing of the visible Internet and characterization of hosts and
addresses hidden to active probing.
This paper is the ﬁrst to show that censuses can walk the
entire IPv4 address space. We begin to quantify sources of
measurement error and show that surveys of fractions of the
address space complement full censuses. Our preliminary
application of this methodology shows trends and estimates
of address space utilization and deployment of visible ﬁre-
walls. However, we expect our methodology and datasets to
broaden the ﬁeld of Internet measurements from routers and
trafﬁc to the network edge.
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A Implementation Details
Addition to our description of methodology (Section 2),
we next describe several important aspects of the implemen-
tation.
We have implemented our census taker as a simple C++
program. It implements rate limiting by maintaining a ﬁxed
array of currently outstanding probe control blocks (PCBs).
PCBs time out after a ﬁxed controlled interval (5 seconds)
and are replaced by newly constructed PCBs with different
destination addresses. Thus, the effective probe rate is de-
termined by the ratio of the PCB array size (currently 1200
entries) to the timeout. A scheduler paces probes within the
time-out interval to avoid bursts.
We use the ICMP identiﬁer ﬁeld to match ICMP replies
with PCBs. ICMP sequence numbers are used as indices
in the PCB array for fast PCB lookups. A vast majority of
replies are matched by this mechanism, but in some cases
(remote ICMP implementations that do not echo the source
message and sequence number) we resort to searching by IP
address. We have also experimented with sending a 32-bit
random cookie in the body of ICMP message to identify the
probe, but many ICMP implementations do not return this
cookie in the ICMP response.
Our census taker must enumerate the entire address space
in an order that touches adjacent addresses at very different
times. Our current implementation (in use since IT11) uses a
three-step algorithm. First, it enumerates all 32-bit addresses
in order, guaranteeing completeness. To disperse probes to
any given subnet across time, we bit-reverse this address, so
that any n-bit block is probed only once every 232−n probes.
Each census also exclusive-ors the series with an arbitrary
constant, ensuring that each follows a different absolute or-
der. This algorithm can be checkpointed with only 64 bits
of state, and it parallelizes easily (currently over four ma-
chines). Finally, we exclude addresses that are unallocated
or that opt out of our study by ﬁltering addresses against a
blacklist stored as a balance balanced binary tree.
We repeat censuses every three months or so. Since
March 2006, each each census has been conducted concur-
rently from two sites, one on the east and west coasts of
the United States. Each site uses four probing machines,
all connected to a single Ethernet segment. The aggregate
bandwidth required for our probes and responses is approx-
imately 166kb/s. The Internet connection at the western site
is well overprovisioned, but we consume about 30% of the
Internet connection capacity at the east coast site.
Our basic survey software implementation is almost iden-
tical to that used for conducting a census, but nearly all of
the address space is ﬁltered. As an optimization, rather than
do this ﬁltering each pass, we compute it once and record
the randomized probe order. Thus the prober can simply re-
play the probes as fast as feasible, limited by a ﬁxed number
of outstanding probes (to cap internal state) and a selected
maximum probe rate (to cap bandwidth consumption).
A survey probes address approximately every 11 minutes,
so a given block could see bursts of up to 254 probes. To
reduce this effect, we pace probes across the 11 minute win-
dow, so any particular /24 block will typically see a probe
once every 2–3 seconds.
B Detailed Methodology of Random Internet
Sample
We next describe the details of our survey of one mil-
lion random Internet addresses; the results are summarized
in Section 3.2.2.
For each address, we send both an ICMP echo request and
a TCP SYN to port 80, each within 200 microseconds. We
observe the TCP reply, treating any TCP response (SYN-
ACK or RST) from port 80 and a probed source address
as positive response indicating the presence at that address.
Some ICMP responses are also treated as positive indica-
tions, such as ICMP port 80 unreachable, ICMP protocol
TCP unreachable, or ICMP host/net unreachable, provided
their source is the probed address. Other ICMP replies, or
replies sourced by an address other that probed are treated
as a negative response conﬁrming the absence of a host. Be-
cause we record all TCP and ICMP trafﬁc, we do not have
timeouts. To mimic our ICMP approach as closely as pos-
sible, SYN generation is done by a custom program and re-
sponses are observed through packet snifﬁng, so the prober’s
TCP stack is not involved and SYN retransmissions do not
occur. Ordering of probe type was randomized in each pair,
although we observe no difference in results when we exam-
ine subsets that ﬁx ordering. Unfortunately, all researcher-
available sources of general Internet trafﬁc are IP-address
anonymized, so we cannot provide passive analysis here. 0
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Figure 12: Comparison of A(block) for coarse and ﬁne time
scale data for IT15w and 1-repaired IT
survey
15w .
C Comparing Coarse and Fine Timescale
Measurements
Extendingourevaluationcomparisonsoftime-andspace-
tradeoffs in probing (Section 4), we next compare coarse and
ﬁne-timescale measurements.
A signiﬁcant difference between our census and surveys
is the timescale of measurement: a census probes a given ad-
dress every 3 months, while a survey every 11 minutes. Thus
while it makes sense to treat a survey’s consecutive probes
of the same address as a timeseries, it is more difﬁcult to
evaluate evolution across censuses because long-term host
changes (renumbering and host birth and death) are signiﬁ-
cant. In addition, loss repair is not generally possible
However, we can compare a concurrent census and survey
to gain some validation of their accuracy. Because A(addr)
is poorly deﬁned for a single census, we compare A(block)
for /24 blocks in IT11w and IT
survey
11w .
To compare census and survey, we arrange all blocks by
increasing A(block)survey computed from 1-repaired survey
data. Since this survey represents 916 probes of each address
spread over one week, we consider this as ground truth. We
then group subnets that have similar A(block)survey values,
gathering 254 integral “bins” with about that number of re-
sponsive hosts in the block. Finally we calculate the corre-
sponding A(block)census from census data for the same sub-
net. In each A(block)survey bin we therefore get some number
of similar A(block)census. From these values we plot the mean
and 90% conﬁdence intervals of A(block)census.
This comparison is shown for IT15w and IT
survey
15w in Fig-
ure12. Ideallythemeansshouldmatchthediagonalandcon-
ﬁdence intervals should be zero. We see a reasonable match
(the correlation coefﬁcient is 0.74). The values are close for
blocks with lower availability (A < 0.5), but we see that the
census under-estimates A(block) value for higher availability
blocks.
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Figure 13: Density of all afﬁrmative /24 Internet address
blocksfromIT1 throughIT15w, groupedbypercentile-binned
block availability and uptime.
We believe the match is poorer for large A values because
there are many stable blocks with only one or two stable
hosts. If a census misses one of these hosts due to probe
loss, that block will show very high error. Two other poten-
tial causes are that survey IT
survey
15w lasted only 6 days, from
Wednesday through Tuesday. It may be that more hosts are
more frequently unavailable on weekends. A ﬁnal possibility
is that our survey’s probe rate of 1 probe every 2–3 seconds
is too high and is triggering block-level ICMP rate-limiting.
Because census estimates of A(block) are relatively
sparse, we had some concern that they might be overly al-
tered by loss. From this comparison we conclude that block-
level estimates are quite similar from both a census and a sur-
vey, providing conﬁdence in the accuracy of A(block)census
D Alternative (A,U) Evaluations
Section 2.4 introduced the metrics of availability (A)
and uptime (U) to characterize addresses and blocks, and
Figure 2 showed the distribution of survey address blocks
across the (A,U)-plane. Here we show two alternative eval-
uations: census address blocks, and survey individual ad-
dresses. These alternatives help evaluate the sensitivity of
these metrics to probe interval and degree of averaging.
D.1 Census Blocks on the (A,U)-Plane
We ﬁrst consider valuations of (A(block),U(block)) over
census data. As described in Section 2.4, computation of
U(block) over census data can be problematic because the
sampling timescale is much coarser than the duty cycle of
dynamic addresses, so we wish to see if this metric is at all
similar to more accurate computations over survey data.
Figure 13 shows the (A,U) graph for the ﬁrst 15 censuses.
This ﬁgure considers only blocks that have some address that
respond positively at some point. In fact, the majority of
blocks are non-responsive, and so 8,256,560 blocks should
appear at (A = 0,U = 0). 1e-07
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Figure 14: Density of all responding Internet addresses from
IT
survey
15w , grouped by percentile-binned address availability
and uptime.
Despite this, this ﬁgure suggests some aspects of the In-
ternet address space utilization. First, the vast majority of
blocks are lightly utilized with low uptime, near (A,U) =
(0,0). However, a few blocks are heavily utilized and al-
waysup(near(1,1))Manualexamination suggeststhatthese
blocks near (1,1) represent server farms, typically hosting
many different web and mail sites. Second, blocks with a
medium value of A get pulled apart, where larger U values
suggest blocks with servers that turned on mid-way through
our census, while smaller U values suggest blocks blocks
where hosts come and go frequently.
Many hosts follow the A =U diagonal. These hosts cor-
respond to a single uptime occurrence, whether it’s a server
that is always up, or a non-responsive host that replied only
once in all 14 censuses.
Finally, we can compare this ﬁgure to block-averaged re-
sults over survey data in Figure 2. In spite of the large
difference in probing interval, these show several similari-
ties. Both show most of the probability mass near (0,0),
with a few hosts tending towards (1,1), and a void around
(A,U) = (1,0). The largest difference is the strong trend
with census data towards the A = U diagonal, while survey
data shows that lower utilizations actually have much shorter
uptimes (away from the diagonal). This difference reﬂects
the statistical nature of very coarse probe intervals.
D.2 Survey Addresses on the (A,U)-Plane
Averaging over blocks may obscure the behavior of indi-
vidual hosts. We therefore next use survey data to evaluate
(A,U) for addresses instead of blocks,
Figure 14 shows a density plot for (A(addr),U(addr))
computed over one survey (IT
survey
15w and counted across a
100×100 grid. It is useful to compare it to a block-level
survey plot (Figure 2) and our block-level census plot (Fig-
ure 13).
category count vs. stable
addresses probed 81,664
non-responding 54,078
any 27,586
TCP and passive 6,155
stable ICMP 9,993 100%
stable servers 4,193 42%
stable non-servers 5,800 58%
non-stable servers 1,962
non-stable non-servers 69,709
Table 5: Comparison of ICMP, Nmap, and passive observa-
tion of server bounds at USC.
The general probability mass in host-level analysis of sur-
vey data closely matches our block-level survey analysis
(Figure 2), with most of the probability mass in (0,0), but
also large numbers of hosts along the U = 0 axis and some
near A = 1.
The main new feature not seen in block-averaged survey
data is the presence of a signiﬁcant number of hosts along the
A =U diagonal, and, in general, on theU = A/(n+1) diag-
onals for n a non-negative integer. These diagonals highlight
the relationship between A and U, where the gap between
(A,U) = (1,1) and (1,0.5), and, in general, between (d,d)
and (d, d
(n+1)) follows because a single outage halves the U
value of an otherwise continuously up host, and n outages
track the d
(n+1) diagonal. We partially correct for outages
due to packet loss through loss repair (Section 3.5), but out-
ages longer than our repair duration (presumably periods of
true downtime) still cause this relationship. This feature was
also present in census block data (Figure 13), but is obscured
when block-level averaging is applied to survey data.
D.3 Bounding Servers in the Internet
One of our goals in evaluating stable addresses is to esti-
mateanupperboundonthenumberofserversintheInternet.
We hypothesized that most hosts offering services to other
computers must be stable and accessible. By comparing ob-
served address stability to observations at USC, we discov-
ered that this assumption does not hold in today’s network.
While popular servers are stable, a surprising number com-
puters offer services but are only intermittently available.
We believe this result shows wide use of Internet-connected
appliances and casually run servers; always-available data
servers are only a majority of servers on the Internet.
To evaluate how stable addresses are used we revisit our
week-long survey at USC, ICMP-nmap
survey
USC . Table 5 com-
pares the number of stable addresses to conﬁrmed servers.
We deﬁne stability as 95% responsive A(addr), and compare
these two alternatives: a TCP-determined server is an ad-
dress that responds to active TCP probing on our ﬁve ports
(HTTP, HTTPS, MySQL, FTP, and SSH) with a SYN-ACK;
a passive-identiﬁed server’s address appears in the source
ﬁeld of captured TCP SYN-ACK packets.
This evaluation shows that servers are often stable (by
about a 2:1 ratio). There are also many addresses that are
stable but not servers (58% of stable addresses). We assumethese are client hosts are left on at all times, perhaps used in
laboratories or public places. (These may represent an op-
portunity for energy conservation.)
We were surprised by the number of non-stable servers,
though, and examined our data more closely since they
represented important hosts (servers) missed in our survey.
First, of the 1,962 non-stable servers, some servers may ﬁl-
ter our ICMP probes. We classify these as 0-stability, un-
used addresses (with set notation, TCP-responsive \ ICMP-
stable). There are 773 of these, 13% of ground truth. All
of these servers will be visible to active probing with TCP,
suggesting that multiple active techniques could more accu-
rately bound on servers.
Second, a few servers do not reply to either ICMP or
TCP probes yet appear in passive traces (passive \ (TCP-
responsive ∪ ICMP-stable)). We expect that these servers
respond only to a few whitelisted hosts. We observe 27 of
these, 0.44% of ground truth. These servers will be invisible
to any general active probing.
Finally, we concluded that a relatively large number of
servers are simply not stable. We observe 1189 of these, 19%
of ground truth. To understand this class of Internet hosts we
extracted a random sample of 50 addresses and investigated
them by looking at their hostnames, default web page con-
tents, and operating system. We found that just over half of
our sample were dynamically assigned addresses, about 18%
were embedded devices (8 printers and 1 camera), two were
default installation websites, while the rest did not respond
or could not be identiﬁed. Another potential source of insta-
bility in servers is load balancing one service across multi-
ple physical servers. We conclude that most (78% of unsta-
ble servers, or 15% of ground truth) “servers” that are un-
stable are actually non-traditional servers—either dynamic
hosts that happen to be running web servers, or embedded
devices that are turned off at night.
From this analysis we can conclude that stable addresses
can provide a very loose upper bound on the number of
servers on the Internet, overestimating by a factor of about
two. Assuming 42% of stable addresses are servers, and
34.4M stable addresses, or 52M to 60M stable addresses af-
ter correcting for ﬁrewalls, we suggest that there are are be-
tween 14M and 25M stable servers on the Internet.